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Abstract 
 
We consider two basic versions of the challenge-response 
authentication protocol, and exhibit both a method of attack 
and a simple modification preventing such attacks.  We go on 
to consider three variants of the basic protocols, and show 
that one of them is completely insecure. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Challenge-response protocols are widely used for identity 
verification over insecure channels.  Two versions of the 
challenge-response identification protocol are described in 
Davies and Price's book, [3].  The simplest, described on 
p.185, we call Protocol P, and is as follows.  Suppose that A 
and B are two entities wishing to verify the identity of each 
other.  Further suppose that A and B share a piece of secret 
information K (known as a password or key), which they will 
use to check each other's identity.  Finally, also suppose 
that O is a one-way function, i.e. a function that is easy to 
compute yet very difficult to invert.  A and B then exchange 
messages P1-P3 (where A -> B indicates a message sent from A 
to B, and X,Y indicates the concatenation of items X and Y): 
P1:  A -> B:  RA  (a random value) 
P2:  B -> A:  RB, O( K, RA )  (RB is another random value) 
P3:  A -> B:  O( K, RB ) 
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A knows that B sent P2 since, apart from A, only B knows K, 
and, similarly, B knows that A sent P3.  The use of the random 
values RA and RB prevents the replay of previously valid 
exchanges. 
 
Such schemes are widely used.  In particular, dynamic password 
schemes use part of Protocol P; they usually omit RB from 
message P2 and the whole of P3.  Dynamic password schemes are 
used in the following situation. 
 
Suppose B is a remote user of a computer system A, and that B 
has asked to log on to A.  In order to check B's claimed 
identity, A sends B a challenge (RA) and B returns O( K, RA ).  
The part of the protocol not used would enable B to verify the 
identity of A; this is normally assumed to be unnecessary for 
remote login, although this could be a useful service.  
Dynamic password systems have been readily available for some 
time, typically involving users being supplied with 
calculator-like devices equipped with a secret key known only 
to the central computer.  Human users are required to copy the 
challenge (RA) from their terminal into the device, and then 
copy back the response, i.e. O( K, RA ).  For further details 
about such devices see, for example, Beker, [2]. 
 
Because of the importance of the basic protocol, there have 
been recent moves within I.S.O. to standardise one version of 
it within a larger standard covering four different peer-
entity authentication techniques.  A draft document was 
submitted for voting as an I.S.O. Draft proposal during 1988, 
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[5].  The version described in that document differs to some 
extent from the version described above, although the basic 
idea remains the same.  The three-message protocol 
(Protocol Q) is as follows (where E represents a (reversible) 
encryption function, and EK represents the particular 
encryption function prescribed by key K). 
Q1:  A -> B:  RA  (a random value) 
Q2:  B -> A:  EK( RA, RB )  (RB is another random value) 
Q3:  A -> B:  RB 
 
 
A weakness in the authentication process 
 
We now show that both protocols P and Q are subject to 
possible reflection attacks.  Suppose A and B authenticate 
each other using Protocol P, and that user C wishes to 
impersonate B to A.  The attack essentially involves running 
two copies of the protocol simultaneously, as we now see. 
 
A initiates the protocol by sending P1, i.e. A sends RA to C.  
Having received RA, C inaugurates a second copy of the same 
protocol but in the reverse direction, by sending RA to A and 
pretending that it has come from B.  A responds to the receipt 
of this message by sending back O( K, RA ) concatenated with 
another random value, RA' say.  C , having received this 
message, uses it to respond to A's initial challenge, thereby 
successfully completing the authentication protocol.  A 
believes itself to be talking to B when, in fact, B has not 
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been involved in any of the communications.  The same type of 
attack will also work with Protocol Q. 
 
It might be argued that the above scenario is unrealistic, and 
that in most circumstances A will not permit two versions of 
the protocol to run simultaneously.  However, this protocol 
might well be used in a networked computing environment, where 
each computer is capable of simultaneously communicating with 
a number of other computers over a number of channels.  In 
this case, the above attack would probably be easy to operate. 
 
One possible fix would be to insist that, whenever this 
protocol is used, checks are always included to prevent two 
copies of it running simultaneously.  However, this is both 
inelegant and unnecessarily restrictive, since other, simpler 
means of avoiding the problem are available. 
 
Basically, the reflection attack works because of symmetry in 
the protocol.  Messages P2 and Q2 have the same form 
regardless of whether they are passed from A to B or vice 
versa.  Two possible solutions arise immediately from this 
observation. 
 
The first involves A and B sharing two secret keys, KAB and 
KBA, where KAB is only ever used to prepare messages by A and 
is used by B for checking messages from A (and vice versa).  
With this modification, P2, P3 and Q2 become: 
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P2':  B -> A:  RB, O( KBA, RA ) 
P3':  A -> B:  O( KAB, RB ) 
Q2':  B -> A:  EKBA( RA, RB ) 
 
To be fair, Davies and Price essentially suggest this protocol 
on p.185 of their book, [3], but without stating why.  The 
second possible solution involves inserting the name of the 
message originator in P2, P3 and Q2 as follows, thereby 
preventing their re-use in the reverse direction: 
P2":  B -> A:  RB, O( K, RA, B ) 
P3":  A -> B:  O( K, RB, A ) 
Q2":  B -> A:  EK( RA, RB, B ) 
 
Both of these solutions require very little extra overhead. 
 
 
Extensions to the protocol and their limitations 
 
Because of the usefulness and simplicity of Protocols P and Q, 
a number of variations have been introduced in order to 
provide a wider range of security services.  We consider three 
of them here, and, where relevant, note their limitations. 
 
We start by considering the second protocol given in Davies 
and Price's book, [2].  On pages 140,141 they suggest the use 
of the following variant of Protocol P, which we call Protocol 
R.  This variant simultaneously provides message integrity and 
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message origin authentication for the three messages M1, M2 
and M3. 
R1:  A -> B:  RA, M1, O( K, M1, RA ) 
R2:  B -> A:  RB, M2, O( K, M2, RA, RB ) 
R3:  A -> B:  M3, O( K, M3, RB ) 
 
This protocol seems sound, although, as Davies and Price point 
out, B cannot trust the validity of message M1 until the 
receipt of R3.  However, the protocol is still potentially 
subject to reflection attacks.  Introducing some asymmetry, as 
described above, would prevent these attacks.  Note that the 
inclusion of RB within the scope of O in R2 is not essential 
to the protocol. 
 
It is interesting to note that a version of Protocol R has 
been proposed for use with a Dynamic Password scheme (see 
Beker, [2]).  In this latter case M1 and O( K, M1, RA ) are 
omitted from R1, the value RB is omitted from R2, and R3 is 
omitted altogether. 
 
The second variation we consider is described by Diffie, [4].  
This protocol, a variation of Protocol Q we call Protocol S, 
provides key exchange for connection security. 
S1:  A -> B:  EK( SK ), ESK( RA ) 
S2:  B -> A:  ESK( RA, RB ) 
S3:  A -> B:  ESK( RB ) 
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SK is a session key used only for the duration of one protocol 
exchange.  Diffie, [4], goes on to describe how RA and RB, 
since they are secret, can be used to provide a range of 
security services for subsequent communications between A and 
B. 
 
This protocol appears fundamentally sound.  However, as 
before, it should be clear that this protocol is potentially 
subject to reflection attacks.  This is not a problem for the 
particular situation in which Diffie proposes to use the 
protocol, although it should be noted by anyone wishing to use 
this protocol in other environments.  As before, the problem 
can be rectified by the addition of asymmetry into the 
protocol. 
 
The third protocol variant we consider is due to Arditti et 
al., [1].  They propose using a modified version of Protocol P 
to directly provide authentication and/or encryption of short 
messages.  To provide just message authentication they use a 
simplified version of Protocol R.  To provide message 
encryption they use protocol T, as below: 
T1:  A -> B:  RA 
T2:  B -> A:  M + O( K, RA ) 
where, for example, O( K, RA ) and M are made up of 8-bit 
characters and K+M denotes character-wise addition modulo 256.  
Of course M may only have at most as many characters as 
O( K, RA ). 
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Suppose C observes such a protocol exchange and wishes to 
discover M.  C now impersonates A and sends RA to B (that is 
the same value of RA as used in the observed protocol).  If B 
has a new message M' to send to A then B will respond with 
M' + O( K, RA ). 
C will then be able to immediately compute the value M + M', 
which may be sufficient to reveal part of the contents of both 
M and M' (if M and M' contain sufficient redundancy).  
Moreover M' may actually be empty, in which case C can 
immediately deduce M.  In any case the protocol is insecure 
and should never be used.  Arditti et al. go on to propose a 
similar protocol attempting to provide both confidentiality 
and authentication for a short message - this protocol is also 
subject to the same kind of attack. 
 
 
Summary 
 
From the above discussion it should be clear that the 
challenge-response protocol is basically sound if used with 
care.  In general, because of the possibility of reflection 
attacks, it would seem a wise precaution to always use an 
asymmetric form of the protocol, using one of the two possible 
modifications suggested above.  The protocol can be used for 
peer-entity authentication and key-exchange in addition to 
user identification.  However any such extensions should be 
carefully analysed before use; otherwise problems of the type 
encountered in Protocol T above may arise. 
CHALLENGE-RESPONSE AUTHENTICATION 
Page 10 
References 
 
[1]  ARDITTI, D., CAMPANA, M., ALLEGRE, F., and COHEN, R.: 
'Access control with a minimal investment'. Proceedings of 
SECURICOM 89, Paris, 1989, pp.159-169. 
 
[2]  BEKER, H.J.: 'Secure access control to host 
applications'. Proceedings of the Second IEE International 
Conference on Secure Communications, London, 1986, pp.20-21. 
 
[3]  DAVIES, D.W., and PRICE, W.L.: 'Security for computer 
networks' (John Wiley, Chichester, 1984). 
 
[4]  DIFFIE, W.: 'Protection of terminal to host 
communications by end-to-end cryptography'. Proceedings of 
SECURICOM 89, Paris, 1989, pp.331-338. 
 
[5]  I.S.O.: 'Peer entity authentication mechanisms using an 
N-bit secret-key algorithm', ISO/IEC/JTC1/SC20/WG1/N153, April 
1988. 
 
